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This is a tremendous book. It brings together and synthesises Marc LangeÕs highly original 
work over the past decade on non-causal explanation in science and mathematics. Like much 
of LangeÕs oeuvre, it represents naturalistic metaphysics of science that draws inspiration and 
support from a wealth of detailed, carefully researched examples from the sciences, going 
back to the early 19th century and beyond. LangeÕs rich set of examples features many 
intricate explanations that are bona fide scientific, but do not require any particular technical 
expertise in e.g. modern physics. The way in which these examples are coupled with open-
minded Ñ dare I say adventurous Ñ metaphysics of modality makes for an exciting and 
thought-provoking read, inviting the reader to follow Lange down the rabbit hole into a world 
of subjunctive facts (familiar from LangeÕs (2009) Laws and Lawmakers). 
By contemporary publishing standards this tome offers two-books-in-one: a book-length 
exploration of non-causal explanation in the empirical sciences (Parts 1 and 2) is followed by 
an almost equally substantive study of explanation internal to mathematics (Part 3) Ñ a topic 
on which much less has been written. Lange finds fascinating connections and unifying 
threads running through all three parts, completely justifying the single-volume presentation 
of the wide-ranging material. The emerging theory of explanation is pluralistic, but while 
there is no single unifying account of non-causal explanation on offer Ñ either with respect 
to science or maths Ñ Lange brings out various Ôfamily resemblancesÕ between the different 
kinds of non-causal explanation that make them different Ôspecies of the same genusÕ. Far 
from being a mere descriptive exercise in classifying and distinguishing between these 
different species, however, LangeÕs main aim is to provide a detailed philosophical theory of 
the very explanatoriness of these explanations Ñ why and how they work qua explanations 
Ñ that makes sense of how scientists and mathematicians have viewed, and argued about, the 
examples at stake.  
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In the rest of this review I will focus very selectively on Part 1 of the book, in which 
Lange develops his account of Ôscientific explanations by constraintÕ. This account dominates 
LangeÕs discussion of non-causal explanation in science. (In Part II Lange identifies two 
much less prominent species: dimensional and Ôreally statisticalÕ explanations.) Explanations 
by constraint form a very wide-ranging kind, covering many of the usual suspects in the 
flourishing literature on non-causal explanation, ranging from KoenigsbergÕs bridges to 
symmetry principles in physics. I will identify some challenges to LangeÕs account of at least 
some such explanations. While I also regard most of LangeÕs examples of Ôexplanation by 
constraintÕ non-causal, I am inclined to associate their explanatoriness to a rather different 
kind of modal information, involving an explanandumÕs counterfactual dependence on the 
explanans.  
 Explanations by constraint work Òby describing how the explanandum arises from 
certain facts (ÒconstraintsÓ) possessing some variety of necessity stronger than ordinary laws 
of nature possessÓ (10). Lange presents varied examples of such explanations, including 
explanations of conservation laws, of the parallelogram law of forces, and of the Lorentz 
transformations of special relativity, to name a few. One particularly important set of 
examples falls under the heading of distinctly mathematical explanations, which often turn on 
facts about the world that hold with mathematico-logical necessity. As a variety of necessity 
that is Òstronger than ordinary laws of nature possess,Ó mathematico-logical necessity seems 
relatively incontestable. (LangeÕs hierarchical theory of laws, with various degrees of modal 
strength amongst the contingent nomological facts themselves, is certainly much less 
orthodox.) It makes sense for Lange to begin the book by applying the notion of explanation 
by constraint to distinctly mathematical explanations, which offer a paradigmatic and 
relatively incontestable example of Ôstronger than nomologicalÕ necessity. But, as I will argue, 
there are significant challenges to analysing the explanatoriness of distinctly mathematical 
explanations by reference to mathematical necessity.  
Let us focus on the simple example that Lange begins with: why cannot Mother divide 23 
strawberries evenly amongst her 3 children (without cutting any)? Because 23 is not divisible 
by 3 Ñ a mathematical fact. Although not an example of scientific explanation, this is a nice 
exemplar of a mathematical explanation of an empirical fact: a Ôbecause without causeÕ. One 
can feel the pull of the explanation-by-constraint idea by noticing that the causal features 
involved in any possible attempt to divide the strawberries, as per impossible, are irrelevant 
to the failure. Any particular set of causal trajectories, and even the causal laws involved, are 
either irrelevant, or presupposed by the why-question at stake (which takes it as read, for 
 3 
example, that strawberries have persistence as individuals, such that they do not undergo 
spontaneous fission). Change the causal features of the world however you like, the negative 
outcome is always determined (ÒconstrainedÓ) by the fact that a set of 23 distinct individuals 
does not have equinumerous non-overlapping proper subsets. This is a necessary truth of a 
mathematico-logical sort, the necessity of which transcends those of ordinary laws of nature. 
Lange reasons that this simple example is distinctly mathematical by virtue of thus turning on 
the mathematico-logical necessity involved. Hence it is also non-causal, since no contingent 
causal fact is responsible for the negative outcome. Reflections broadly along these lines 
provide Lange the initial reason and impetus to regard some non-causal explanations as 
explanations by constraint. Having fleshed out this idea, Lange puts it to work in providing a 
unified account of various non-causal explanations that involve Ômodally exaltedÕ facts 
(relative to more contingent nomological and causal features). This philosophical work done 
by the explanation-by-constraint notion then provides further evidence for it, as well as 
indications how to refine it further.  
I grant that there is mathematico-logical necessity involved in e.g. the strawberry 
example, and also independence of the explanandum from any actual or possible causal laws. 
So, plausibly we are indeed dealing with, in some sense, Ôdistinctly mathematicalÕ 
explanation, which furthermore seem genuinely non-causal Ñ in as far as it seems plausible 
that any causal explanation should turn on some contingent causal regularity. But granting all 
that, I do not yet see why we should think that what is doing the explaining, and providing us 
the explanatory understanding, crucially involves information about the necessity involved. 
On the contrary, I see at least a couple of distinct challenges to the idea that explanatory 
understanding here hangs on seeing how the explanandum arises from facts more necessary 
than ordinary laws.  
One challenge, as I will explain below, is that information about the strong degree of 
necessity involved risks being too cheap: the exalted modal aspect of the explanandum can 
be communicated without doing much explaining, and it can be grasped without having much 
understanding. Another challenge relates to the way in which the idea of explanation by 
constraint envisions a substantial ÔjointÕ in the nature of scientific explanations: non-causal 
explanations-by-constraint work by providing modal information about strong degree of 
necessity, which is a rather different kind of modal information from that provided by causal 
explanations regarding e.g. contingent difference-makers or dependence. In advocating such 
pluralism regarding how explanations work, Lange faces the challenge of pinning down the 
difference due to which explanations work so differently.  
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Let me elaborate, starting with the second challenge. One might think that in the case of 
distinctly mathematical explanations, at least, we can justify their sui generis character by 
reference to the aforementioned independence of the explanandum from any contingent 
nomological regularity. Given this complete independence, what else could possibly be doing 
the explaining, apart from the sheer necessity of the negative outcome, given the presumed 
mathematico-logical fact? Well, in the case of strawberries, for example, there is also all the 
information from basic arithmetic regarding how things would be different if Mother had a 
different number of strawberries or kids to play with. Ideologically this kind of information is 
nicely continuous with the prominent idea Ñ familiar from causal accounts of explanation Ñ 
that explanatory understanding is a matter of possessing dependence information regarding 
how the explanandum would be different if the explanans were different. Thus, a natural 
alternative to LangeÕs take on the strawberry example is to emphasise the continuity between 
this case and garden-variety causal explanations. From what we can call the counterfactual-
dependence perspective, explanations, causal and non-causal alike, can explain by virtue of 
providing what-if-things-had-been-different information that captures a dependence relation 
between the explanandum and the explanans. We can even regard the specific number of 
strawberries as a causal feature of the set-up, as Lange does, and nevertheless deem the 
explanation at hand non-causal on the grounds that the explanatory connection between the 
number of strawberries and the failure of MotherÕs attempts is mediated by an explanatory 
connection that is more intimate and necessary than any causal law. Similar remarks apply to, 
e.g., KoenigsbergÕs bridges, for which graph-theory conveniently provides us analogous 
modal information (see Jansson and Saatsi (forthcoming); Woodward (forthcoming).) 
Nothing in LangeÕs discussion indicates how this alternative perspective on distinctly 
mathematical explanations falls short of locating the real source of explanatoriness in a rather 
different kind of modal information also involved in the strawberry example. (To be fair, 
Lange notes in relation to some other specific explanations of constraint that the kind of 
modal information required by the counterfactual-dependence perspective does not seem to 
be available.) Furthermore, by comparing the explanatory import of the two kinds of modal 
information we can raise the first challenge. If we squeeze out, as it were, all the modal 
information regarding how MotherÕs predicament would differ as a function of the number of 
strawberries/kids, it looks that we are left with a very shallow explanation at best, even if we 
fully retain the information concerning the exalted modal status of the explanandum.  
For instance, we could deductively prove, with logic alone, that Mother is bound to fail 
given her specific number of strawberries. This is because a mathematical explanation for any 
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specific finite number of strawberries is nominalisable. That proof would presumably provide 
information of the exact sort that Lange identifies as doing the explanatory heavy lifting, but 
presumably an agent who received only that information Ñ without any background 
arithmetical knowledge, perhaps Ñ does not understand MotherÕs plight very well. Adding 
basic arithmetic into the picture does not increase or change the quality of the information 
about the strong degree of necessity per se, but it does add a lot in terms of how the failure 
depends on the specific numbers involved. To my mind considerations along these lines 
support the counterfactual-dependence perspective with respect to various distinctly 
mathematical explanations (see Jansson and Saatsi (forthcoming); Saatsi (2016)). At the very 
least, they suggest that we should not hang the analysis of explanatoriness entirely on the 
hook of modal ÔconstraintÕ.  
An advocate of the counterfactual-dependence perspective need not deny that some 
explanations are worth identifying as Ôdistinctly mathematicalÕ. From this perspective it is 
natural to hypothesise that a necessary condition for a distinctly mathematical explanation is 
that the explanatory connection between the explanandum and the explanans Ñ the 
connection that underwrites the explanatory what-if-things-had-been-different information Ñ
holds with logico-mathematical necessity. Lange considers and rejects this idea. He argues 
that some explanations can turn on contingent law-like features of the world, while still being 
distinctly mathematical due to suitably involving both mathematics and an exalted degree of 
necessity. Lange demonstrates this with the following example. Why does a double pendulum 
have at least four equilibrium configurations? An answer of considerable explanatory 
generality employs the mathematical fact that the configuration space for any double 
pendulum has the same doughnut-like torus topology, given how it is parameterised by two 
angles α and β both ranging 360 degrees (see 
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_pendulum). Lange argues that this mathematical fact 
guarantees that there will be at least four configurations for which the forces acting on the 
pendulum vanish. 
Now, in order for a system to count as a pendulum there needs to be a force that acts upon 
the system, causing it to move unless it is in an equilibrium position. This can be specified by 
a potential energy function U(α, β). There also needs to be a law-like connection between the 
gradient of potential energy and acceleration: a special case of NewtonÕs second law. Despite 
the fact that the double pendulum explanation absolutely requires appeal to such causal 
features concerning forces and accelerations, Lange regards it as distinctly mathematical, 
since Òno aspect of the particular forces operating on or within the system (which would 
 6 
make a difference to [the systemÕs potential energy] U(α, β) matters to this explanationÓ (27, 
my emphasis). 
 I do not think Lange has demonstrated an appropriate independence of the explanandum 
from the relevant causal features to show that this is an explanation by constraint, or even a 
distinctly mathematical explanation. While it is undoubtedly true that the explanation 
abstracts away from various particular aspects of the forces, or, equivalently, the potential 
energy function, involved, it is nevertheless the case that the torus topology of the 
configuration space only entails the minimum number of equilibrium configurations in 
conjunction with features of a potential energy function. Properly understanding how the 
configuration space topology is related to the number of equilibrium configurations still 
involves grasping how the former would be different if the potential energy function was 
different, as considered below. This again seems to involve what-if-things-had-been-different 
information Ñ and in this case with respect to contingent nomological features of the system, 
perhaps even rendering it a causal explanation, albeit a fairly abstract one.  
Consider, for instance, changing the potential energy function so that it does not pull 
uniformly down, as in the case of a standard gravitational pendulum that Lange probably has 
in mind, but instead pulls symmetrically up above the centre of the pendulum, and down 
below it, so that there is a plane running through the centre where the potential energy 
vanishes. With such forces acting upon the pendulum it will have at least 8 equilibrium 
configurations. Or consider a three-fold symmetrical situation, with three competing forces 
(e.g. identical magnets that are equidistant from the pendulumÕs centre, and 120 degrees 
apart). Such a system has at least 12 equilibrium configurations. Explaining why a double 
pendulum has a given number of equilibrium configurations thus indispensably involves not 
only the torus topology of its configuration space Ñ a mathematical fact pertaining to all 
double pendulums Ñ but also how features of this space in conjunction with contingent facts 
about forces entail different facts about locally vanishing potential energy gradients, viz. 
equilibrium configurations.  
I have dwelled on this particular case because it brings out the second challenge I 
mentioned earlier. Why exactly should we think that the double pendulum, for instance, is 
explained via modally exalted constraints, while some rather similar looking explanations 
explain differently, by providing abstract causal information? Lange contrasts the double 
pendulum case with the abstract causal equilibrium explanation of why a ball is bound to end 
up at the bottom of a concave bowl (30), but I am unable to clearly see the difference. Given 
that the distinction between distinctly mathematical and abstract causal explanations can feel 
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so thin and elusive, why think there is a clear difference in the way these explanations work? 
This question is pressing for Lange since many (most? all?) distinctly mathematical 
explanations that we are inclined to regard as genuinely explanatory seem to offer also the 
kind of modal information that the counterfactual, dependence-based perspective of 
explanation capitalises on.  
Lange might respond by saying that an explanationÕs status as distinctly mathematical is a 
contextual matter (37), but this may only exacerbate the challenge at stake. By LangeÕs lights, 
the double pendulum explanation may count as causal in a context where we emphasise the 
dependence of the minimum number of equilibrium configurations on features of the 
potential energy function, and distinctly mathematical in a context in which we keep the 
forces more fixed and place emphasis on the topology of the configuration space. A 
specification of the potential energy function could of course be packed into the why-
question: e.g., why does a double pendulum in homogenous gravitational field have at least 
four equilibrium configurations? If we do that, I can see how the connection between the 
explanandum and the presuppositions of the why question holds with logico-mathematical 
necessity. But now it is no longer clear to me how explanatory as opposed to demonstrative 
the relevant deduction is.   
LangeÕs discussion implies, indeed, that any explanation involving applied mathematics 
can be turned into a distinctly mathematical explanation by incorporating all of the non-
mathematical facts at stake into the why question (39). For instance, why is it that given that 
mass is additive, if A has the mass of 1kg, and B has the mass of 1kg, then the union A+B has 
the mass of 2kg? Because 1+1=2. This answer, and presumably a huge array of explanations 
akin to it, which can also involve complex mathematics, seem utterly shallow as explanations 
of empirical phenomena, perhaps even entirely non-explanatory. But what is it exactly that 
makes them so deficient as explanations? What do they lack? After all, they give the exact 
right kind of information about stronger-than-nomological necessity that in some other cases 
is identified as doing all (?) the explanatory work? One challenge for Lange is to provide an 
account of explanatory power that makes sense of these respective differences of explanatory 
goodness within the explanation-by-constraint framework. I am more optimistic for 
accounting for these differences from the perspective of the counterfactual-dependence 
account that I have touted as an alternative. It is an important desideratum for any 
philosophical account of explanatoriness to make sense of our largely shared judgements of 
explanationsÕ relative virtues: one explanation being better, more powerful, or deeper, than 
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another. After all, presumably these judgments quite reliably track differences in how well 
explanations work qua explanations.  
There is a huge deal more to be said about the potential virtues and vices of LangeÕs 
explanation-by-constraint account, and I have only managed to discuss some very limited 
aspects of it. Significantly, LangeÕs account also aims to provide an ideologically unified 
theory behind many different kinds of explanations of this ilk, distinctly mathematical 
explanations being just one end of the spectrum. Very broadly applicable philosophical 
theories like LangeÕs cannot be fairly evaluated independently of the much bigger picture to 
which I have not been able to do any justice here. In particular, while I have suggested that 
there is an alternative perspective available to at least some distinctively mathematical 
explanations, and I have elsewhere argued that various other non-causal explanations can also 
be captured in these terms (e.g. Saatsi (2016); French and Saatsi (forthcoming)), it is 
admittedly very much an open question how far the counterfactual-dependence perspective 
can be pushed to accommodate the numerous non-causal explanations that Lange has brought 
to the table. So while my preferred way of thinking about distinctly mathematical 
explanations provides a more unified account in relation to causal explanations, it may lose 
out in conceptual unity elsewhere if it fails to capture many of the other explanations that 
motivate LangeÕs theory of explanations by constraint.  
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